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Abstract 
This paper applies methods of probabilistic population forecasting to assess the 
range of uncertainty of China’s future population trends. Unlike previous 
applications of probabilistic population projections that consider stochastic future 
fertility, mortality and migration, this paper will also account for the significant 
uncertainty of China’s current fertility level (with published figures ranging from 
1.2 to 2.3) and the related uncertainties about the sex ratio at birth (with estimates 
from 1.06 to above 1.2) and the size of the youngest cohorts in the 2000 census. 
The model applied in this paper will be based on assumed uncertainty ranges for 
current conditions, in addition to the probabilistic treatment of future trends. 
Given the sheer size of China’s population, these significant uncertainties about 
current conditions are of high importance not only for the future population of 
China but also for considerations on a global scale. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
Information about population trends at the national level is a key prerequisite for 
policy planning in a large array of topic ranging from social security and health 
provision to the schooling system, labour markets, urban planning and 
infrastructure to national defence. This is why virtually all countries in the world 
collect population data through censuses, surveys or from existing registers and 
use population projections as input to the planning in these fields. For this 
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purpose it is evident that the demographic information provided should be as 
accurate as possible. However, it is not always possible to get completely accurate 
information. As to the future this is due to some extent to the inherent 
indeterminacy of fertility, mortality and migration paths and our limited 
knowledge about the forces driving these trends. In many countries we also lack 
accurate information about current conditions and have no easy way to go and 
improve the accuracy of this information. China is in some respects one of these 
countries and the uncertainty of current and future demographic conditions in 
China is the topic of this paper. 
Uncertainty in future demographic trends is an issue for every country but in 
the case of China it is also a global issue. If one believes that global population 
figures are of more than purely academic interest and that they matter for issues 
as diverse as global carbon dioxide emissions or global labour markets under 
rapidly globalising trade regimes then trends in China’s population are directly 
relevant to the rest of the world. More than with any other country, the sheer size 
of China’s population—which constitutes around 20% of the world’s total—
makes it a key determinant of global population trends. In this light it is surprising 
how much uncertainty exists about the current demographic conditions in the 
world’s biggest country. Recently published figures of China’s total fertility rate 
around 2000 range from 1.22 (NSB 2002a, 2000b) to 2.3 (Liang 2003)—a 
remarkable difference, especially seen on a relative scale (a factor of 1.89). There 
are probably few countries in the world where estimates about current fertility 
rates differ by such a factor. 
Because of China’s weight in the world population, the estimates of the 
current global fertility rates are significantly affected by this uncertainty, as are 
projections for the world population. If fertility in China were currently below 
1.5, as many authors estimate and the UN publishes in its 2004 fertility data sheet 
(UN 2005), instead of the 1.85 assumed by the UN in its recent long-range 
projections (UN 2004), this would influence the assumed fertility level over the 
coming decades and result in markedly lower projected rates of population growth 
(shrinking later in the century) both in China and the world. 
Fertility is not the only uncertain demographic condition in China today. 
Estimates for the sex ratio at birth range from 113 (Wang 2003) to 123 (Ma 
2004). This is a remarkable difference that will significantly influence the future 
proportion of men to women in the adult population and hence population 
dynamics. 
Important uncertainty also exists about the size of the youngest age group. 
The size of the age group 0-4 in 2000 is given as 71 million in the census, but is 
estimated to be 86 million (Zhang et al. 2004). The difference of 15 million in just 
one age group is not only daunting in absolute numbers but also represents a 
sizeable relative difference of 20%. 
The recently released new results of the 2005 National One Percent 
Population Sample Survey (NBS 2007) fit very well into this spectrum of 
different published figures. It gives a TFR of 1.33 for 2005 and a sex ratio at birth 
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of 120.5. Since so far no studies have been published on the accuracy of these 
newest data, we cannot view them as information that helps to narrow the 
uncertainty range yet. Instead we will treat them as one more published figure in 
line with the many others discussed in this paper. 
This paper will first discuss how demographers have traditionally dealt with 
the issue of uncertainty about current conditions—mostly by ignoring that 
uncertainty if accuracy could not be further improved—before moving on to 
future trends and the options for systematically including quantitative information 
about this uncertainty in population estimates and projections. We then discuss 
the wide range of published data about China’s current fertility level, sex ratio 
and the size of the younger population. Next, we consider the range of future 
fertility (including the sex ratio), mortality and migration that should be reflected 
in our projections prior to carrying out probabilistic projections which cover the 
uncertainty of current conditions as well as future trends. The final sections will 
present and discuss the results and draw some conclusions. 
 
 
2  How demographers deal with uncertainty about current 
conditions and future trends 
To be uncertain about the exact size and age structure of a population or the 
current level of fertility, mortality and migration, is nothing new for 
demographers. Almost all empirical information, be it from censuses, vital 
registration or surveys, is imperfect, but the degree of imperfection varies 
significantly from one setting to another. The typical response to such 
imperfection on a minor scale usually is to settle for one number which is then 
used in further analysis without continuing to worry about the uncertainties 
associated. In those rare cases where these published numbers are publicly 
challenged or when demographers themselves feel that the degree of imperfection 
of the given empirical information is intolerable as a basis for analysis and 
interpretation, they tend to have two alternative strategies: either to go out into the 
field and collect new information or to use various kinds of statistical techniques 
so as to improve the given data. Sometimes both methods are combined, but the 
goal is typically the same: to come up with one point estimate that should be as 
close as possible to the real world. This is, of course, a meaningful strategy and it 
is the task of scientific analysis to reduce uncertainty as much as possible. 
However, what is possible under specific conditions is not always sufficient to 
come up with a reliable estimate. In some countries there simply have not been 
any reliable censuses or surveys recently and it is thus beyond the power of the 
analysing demographer to collect better empirical information. In such instances 
point estimates are associated with large uncertainties. In international 
comparisons, these point estimates typically go into tables where, e.g., the highly 
reliable estimate for life expectancy derived from a Nordic population register 
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stands next to the estimated figure for some African countries where the level of 
mortality can only be known in a very broad range. 
Typically, the user of such internationally comparative tables is not given any 
indication about differential uncertainties surrounding these point estimates. But 
even if the researchers working with the data are painfully aware of the 
uncertainty of a given point estimate, they mostly see no other choice than to base 
their projections and other analyses on this uncertain point estimate of 
demographic conditions at a given time. In common practice it is considered still 
better to have an imperfect figure that roughly characterises the actual situation 
than to have no figure at all. 
Unlike some other disciplines, there is little tradition in demography to 
process fuzzy information and still be able to maintain the information about the 
uncertainty of any given indicator in the subsequent steps of the analysis. In this 
paper we propose to do so by expanding the methods of probabilistic population 
projections to also include uncertainty distributions of the starting conditions of 
these very projections. 
The field of probabilistic population projections has recently seen a dynamic 
development. In 2004 the International Statistical Review published a special 
issue on how to deal with uncertainty in population forecasting (Lutz and 
Goldstein 2004). It presents a state-of-the-art summary of different dimensions of, 
and different approaches to, probabilistic population projections. It also shows 
how dynamically the field has been expanding since Frontiers of Population 
Forecasting (Lutz, Vaupel and Ahlburg 1999) and the National Research Council 
(2000) report on population projections were written. There is no space here to 
review this field of studies. Suffice it to note that originally there were three rather 
different approaches, which have recently seen some convergence. The first one is 
based on the analysis of errors in past population projections and the assumption 
that future errors will be similar to past errors (Alho 1997; Keilman 1999; Lee 
1999). The second approach is largely based on time series analysis and produces 
stochastic projections on the assumption of structural continuity and constant 
variability (Lee 1993; Lee and Tuljapurkar 1994). The third approach largely rests 
on subjective probability distributions produced by experts in the process of an 
argument-based discussion process about the likely future range of uncertainty in 
fertility, mortality and migration (Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov 1997, 1999). 
While the first two approaches usually distinguish between assumptions on the 
trend (which is mostly based on expert opinion) and the variance (which is 
derived from past errors or time series), under the third approach, trend and 
variance are assumed jointly as being part of the same uncertain process. 
There is considerable debate at the moment about which of the three 
approaches is most appropriate under different conditions of data availability, at 
various stages in the process of demographic transition and in other contextual 
settings. This discussion, which seems to move in the direction of combining 
elements from the different approaches and is summarised in Lutz and Goldstein 
(2004), has not yet resulted in a broad methodological consensus and is unlikely 
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to do so in the near future because of the great variety of conditions under which 
such projections are being produced. In the context of this study on China, it is 
important to note that the full range of options is not applicable to all countries. 
The use of past projection errors is only applicable to populations for which there 
are both a series of past projections and reliable empirical data for verification. 
The time series approach can only be pursued if sufficiently long, high-quality 
time series are available. These preconditions significantly limit the number of 
countries to which all three methods are applicable. As discussed in detail below, 
China clearly does not meet these preconditions. 
Methodologically, this paper goes a step beyond previous probabilistic 
projections in applying the probabilistic approach not only to capture the future 
uncertainty but also to address the uncertainty about current conditions. In 
principle, these two kinds of uncertainty are of a different nature. While the future 
holds some inherent uncertainty that cannot be fully eliminated even with major 
efforts, the uncertainty about current conditions could at least theoretically be 
eliminated through better data collection. Since in practice this is often impossible 
or too expensive the bottom line in many cases is an uncertainty distribution about 
current conditions that is isomorphic to the one about future conditions. 
In terms of methods to be used for this task the approaches other than 
subjective probabilities based on expert knowledge are not applicable. The time 
series approach depends on reliable empirical data by its very nature and is 
meaningless without them, hence, by definition it cannot be applied to uncertain 
empirical information. The approach of learning from past errors could 
theoretically be expanded to refer to errors about point estimates that have later 
been revised as better empirical information became available. But this would 
have to be based on the very strong assumption that there is a universal pattern of 
biases when producing point estimates under conditions of uncertainty about the 
real level of demographic indicators. There is no reason to assume that there is 
such a universal and predictable pattern of biases in estimating current fertility 
levels, sex ratios or age group sizes that would hold for all countries and times. 
Hence, the only alternative is to look carefully at what some of the best experts in 
the country under consideration and the entire scientific literature have to say in 
terms of different attempts to estimate current demographic conditions and then to 
infer an uncertainty distribution from this informed judgement. 
 
 
3  Uncertainty ranges of current demographic conditions 
in China 
3.1 Current fertility level 
Table 1 gives a long list of more than 30 different figures for China’s total fertility 
rate (TFR) around 2000 that have recently been published. The sheer number of 
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these different values given for a situation in which only one number can be true 
gives an indication of the uncertainty as well as of the controversy surrounding 
the current fertility level in China. In this study we will restrict our consideration 
to published figures. The number of unpublished estimates produced by different 
institutions or individuals is probably much greater. These published figures of 
the total fertility rate in China in 2000 span a range from 1.22 (NSB 2002a, 
2000b) to 2.3 (Liang 2003). All the other figures that were published and 
supported by at least a simple transparent rationale lie between these values but 
are clearly not evenly distributed. 
To put things into a temporal perspective, Table 2 gives the time series for the 
TFR since the mid-1980s from five independent sources of data. These show 
considerable variation, but all give values of below 1.5 since the mid-1990s. 
There is, however, widespread agreement among experts that they all tend to be 
subject to underreporting of births, particularly in the years immediately 
preceding each census/survey. The critical question is what degree of 
underreporting should be assumed, and accordingly, what correction factors 
should be applied? This is where the alternative estimates for the TFR around 
2000 differ.  
There is no space here for a detailed discussion of the rationales and methods 
behind the individual figures. These are well documented in the studies 
themselves. For defining an uncertainty distribution of fertility around the year 
2000, we considered two alternative approaches: (1) Simply give every study 
equal weight and calculate the mean and variance of the distribution of different 
figures, which then are used to define a normal distribution. (2) Try to exert some 
judgement about which studies are more authoritative than others and have the 
distribution informed by that choice. While the first rather mechanistic approach 
is intellectually unsatisfactory because it leaves no room for quality judgements, 
the second is in danger of being too dependent on our personal (possibly biased) 
judgement about quality. After extensive considerations and discussions 
(including those at a high level forum on low fertility in East Asia held in Beijing 
in May 2005), we reached a compromise between the two alternative approaches. 
It was decided to use the Retherford et al. (2005) estimate for the TFR of around 
1.5, based on a systematic application of the own-children method, as the median 
of a normal distribution which covers 95% in the range between 1.2 and 1.8. This 
uncertainty range with a symmetric distribution around 1.5 found the broadest  
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Table 1: 
Different estimates of the total fertility rate for China in 2000 
Source TFR Notes 
Wang (2003) 1.718(1)
1.703(2)
1.723(3) 
(1) Uncorrected fertility pattern: calculation directly by age-specific 
fertility rate of 2000 census without considering the underreporting 
of children; (2) Adjustment by reconstructing the underreporting of
children: to keep age/parity-specific rate of 2000 census stable, 
re-estimate the fertility pattern after reconstructing those children
who are underreported in the census; (3) Adjustment by fertility 
pattern of the second child: due to the serious underreporting of the
second child, re-estimate the fertility pattern of the second child by 
reconstructing those children who are underreported in the census. 
Liang (2003) 2.3  
Yuan et al. (2003) 1.71(1) 
1.78(2) 
1.63(3) 
(1) Calculation by National Statistical Yearbook; (2) Statistics of
State Family Planning Committee; (3) Using the surviving method
for children aged 0-10 years in 2000, the number of births has been 
estimated for each year assuming a life expectancy in 1990 of 
67.767 for males and 71.15 for females, and in 2000 of 69.54 for
males and 73.01 for females. 
CPDRC (2003) 1.80  
NSB (2002a, 2000b) 1.22  
Zhang et al. (2004) 1.63(1) 
2.0 (2) 
(1) Adjustment by the underreporting rate of 18.94% for 0-9 years 
old; (2) Assuming the number of population aged 10-19 years old is 
correct, the underreporting rate for children aged 0-9 years old is 
13.68%, and the adjusted TFR is 2.0 assuming the underreporting
rate is the same between 1990 and 2000. 
Zhai (2003) 1.8  
Guo and Chen (2007) 1.58 Calculation by author eliminating tempo effects. 
Zhang and Zhao 
(2006); Zhang (2004) 
1.5-1.6  
Retherford et al. 
(2005) 
1.36(1) 
1.38(2) 
1.58(3) 
(1) Calculation by own-children method; (2) Calculation by birth 
history reconstruction; (3) Adjustment by a factor from the
comparison between the 1990 and 2000 censuses. 
Ding (2003) 1.35  
Scharping (2005) 1.6 To use the educational statistics compared with the data from
National Population and Family Planning Committee and National 
Statistic Bureau for an estimate of TFR. 
SFPC (2002) 1.45  
Cai (2006) 1.5-1.6 To use Preston and Coale’s variable-r method to assess the fertility 
level in China by data from China’s 1990 and 2000 censuses, and 
annual population sample surveys. 
Yu (2002)  1.55(1) 
 1.32(2) 
1.6-
1.8(3) 
(1) Estimated by the number of population from 2000 census data;
(2) Estimated by the number of children from 2000 census data; (3)
Estimated by author. 
ESCAP (2002) 1.8  
U.S. Census Bureau 
(2004) 
1.7  
Zhang and Cui (2003) 1.38(1) 
1.63(2) 
2.0 (3) 
1.8 (4) 
(1) Calculation using only the census long form; (2) Lower limit
value; (3) Upper limit value; (4) Author’s estimated round value. 
SFPC (2001) 1.8  
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consensus among the experts that were involved in the discussions. In the  
projections, the TFR value for 2000 (the starting year of the projections) was 
randomly chosen from this distribution for each of the 1,000 independent cohort 
component projection runs. This chosen level for fertility in 2000 then also serves 
as the base line fertility for the stochastic projections. 
 
Table 2: 
Total fertility rate for China since 1990 
Year NSB1 1992 Survey2 1997 Survey3 2001 Survey4 2000 Census5 
1986 2.42 2.46 2.59   
1987 2.59 2.57 2.66   
1988 2.31 2.28 2.41   
1989 2.25 2.24 2.40   
1990 2.17 2.04 2.29 2.29 2.37 
1991 2.01 1.66 1.75 1.77 1.80 
1992 1.86 1.47 1.57 1.59 1.68 
1993 1.71  1.51 1.52 1.57 
1994 1.56  1.32 1.41 1.47 
1995 1.43  1.33 1.45 1.48 
1996 1.55  1.35 1.36 1.36 
1997 1.46   1.27 1.31 
1998 1.41   1.34 1.31 
1999 1.45   1.29 1.23 
2000    1.45 1.22 
Sources: Cited from Guo (2004) 
1 NSB (1988-2000) 
2 Yu and Yuan (1996) 
3 Guo (2000) 
4 Ding (2003) 
5 Guo (2004) 
 
As with any subjective probability distribution based on expert judgement, 
some experts may disagree with the mean and variance chosen for the distribution 
and/or the argumentation behind this specific choice. In analogy to dealing with 
this issue for assumptions concerning the future the resolution of the problem here 
lies in a continued process of argumentation and scientific evaluation of the 
arguments. The distribution chosen here can be seen as a benchmark that can be 
changed in the future should convincing arguments for doing so be presented. 
However, it needs to be understood that in this probabilistic framework slightly 
differing views about the mean of the distribution are less critical for the outcome 
than in the case of deterministic projections using different point estimates for the 
starting conditions. 
As to the future trends in fertility, the uncertainty interval was assumed to 
open up a bit for the coming decades. Since it is unclear whether the fertility level 
in China will continue to fall or whether it will recover as a consequence of 
government policies that aim at stabilising fertility around 1.8-1.9, the assumed 
95% uncertainty range will go to 1.0-2.0 by 2030 (with linear interpolation 
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between 2000 and 2030). The recently released results from the 2005 National 
One Percent Sample Survey (NBS 2007) with a TFR of 1.33 for 2005 fall well 
toward the centre of this range, depending on the assessment of the undercount in 
that survey. After 2030 the range was assumed to shift slightly upwards to 1.2-2.2 
in accordance with the substantive considerations discussed in Lutz, Sanderson 
and Scherbov (2004). In terms of the age pattern of fertility the simplifying 
assumption was made that it does not vary with the level of fertility and age-
specific fertility rates are derived from proportional changes depending on the 
assumed TFR level. 
 
3.2 Sex ratio at birth 
Tables 3 and 4 provide different estimates of the sex ratio at birth in 2000, another 
uncertain and highly controversial demographic variable. Table 3 reflects that the 
trend of biased sex ratios has become more serious since the mid-1980s. Since we 
only need the total sex ratio for the projections, we focus on the data given in 
Table 4. It gives seven different estimates of the sex ratio at birth in 2000 that 
range from 1.13 to 1.23. We decided to operationalise this uncertainty range by 
assuming a normal distribution with 95% between 1.13 and 1.23. The new results 
of the 2005 Sample Survey (NSB 2007) giving a sex ratio at birth of 120.5 also 
fall well into this range. Over time we assume that by 2030 a normal sex ratio at 
birth of 1.05 will be reached with linear interpolation between 2000 and 2030. 
The distorted sex ratio at birth is very clearly visible from the asymmetry of 
the age pyramid in Figure 1. The projection results (see Figure 2) show this 
asymmetry, particularly for the cohorts born in 1985 and (following our 
assumptions) in 2030. Since fertility rates are only applied to women, this 
distorted sex ratio has a dampening effect on population growth. 
 
Table 3: 
Historical trends in the sex ratio at birth in China, 1953-2000 
Year Sex Ratio at birth Year Sex Ratio at birth Year Sex Ratio at birth 
1953 104.9 1973 107.3 1987 111.0 
1960 110.3 1974 106.6 1988 108.1 
1961 108.8 1975 106.4 1989 111.3 
1962 106.6 1976 107.4 1990 114.7 
1963 107.1 1977 106.7 1991 116.1 
1964 106.6 1978 105.9 1992 114.2 
1965 106.2 1979 105.8 1993 114.1 
1966 112.2 1980 107.4 1994 116.3 
1967 106.6 1981 107.1 1995 117.4 
1968 102.5 1982 107.2 1996 118.5 
1969 104.5 1983 107.9 1997 120.4 
1970 105.9 1984 108.5 1998 122.1 
1971 105.2 1985 111.4 1999 122.7 
1972 107.0 1986 112.3 2000 119.9 
Sources: Gu and Xu (1994) for 1960-1992; Lu (2003) for 1993-2000. 
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Table 4: 
Different estimates for the sex ratio at birth in 2000 
Source Sex Ratio at Birth 
Wang (2003) 113.40 
SPFPC and CPDC (2003) 116.86 
NSB (2002b) 117.79 
Ma (2004) 122.65 
Lu (2003) 119.9 
Banister (2002) 120 
Zhang and Cui (2003) >=115 
 
Figure 1 
Probabilistic age pyramid, 2000 
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Note: The uncertainty distributions are described in the form of fractiles of the distribution of outcomes from all 
simulations. In the figures the black area gives the range between the .4 and .6 fractiles, the dark grey area that 
between .2 and .8 and the light grey that between .025 and .975, i.e., the 95 per cent interval. 
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3.3 Size of youngest age groups 
The third kind of uncertainty of starting conditions which was considered 
explicitly here concerns the age structure and in particular the relative size of the 
youngest age groups. Table 5 provides the age distribution based on the official 
census count. Again there is reason to assume that it includes significant 
underreporting of children that corresponds to the underreporting of births in the 
measurement of recent fertility. This underreporting becomes evident when 
producing projections of the Chinese population based on the starting year 1990 
and when applying alternative fertility rates considered plausible. 
 
Table 5: 
Age distribution of the 2000 census (adjustment by Jiang and Ren) 
Age Male Female Total 
0-4 39080442  32330340  71410782 
5-9 50803287  44105742  94909029 
10-14 68852541  63165421  132017961 
15-19 51910244  48709494  100619739 
20-24 44167951  44101447  88269398 
25-29 57358164  56362758  113720922 
30-34 63871217  62751382  126622599 
35-39 56371339  54871791  111243130 
40-44 43225101  40999383  84224484 
45-49 45995722  44185113  90180835 
50-54 34357617  32420433  66778051 
55-59 25405390  23864012  49269402 
60-64 22783865  21047268  43831133 
65-69 18515844  18251975  36767820 
70-74 13059340  13791954  26851294 
75-79 7541698  9210723  16752421 
80-84 3409902  4890141  8300043 
85-89 1090862  1992949  3083811 
90+ 274580  702567  977147 
Total 648075107  617754893  1265830000 
Note: This adjustment of the raw census data makes the age distribution more consistent by maintaining total 
population count in the census which was equal to 1.26583 billion. 
Source: Jiang and Ren (2005). 
 
There have also been several attempts to correct the age structure of the 2000 
census although the number of such efforts was much smaller than the number of 
different fertility estimates. We decided against systematically studying these 
correction attempts of the age structure because we would have no direct use of 
them in our probabilistic population projections. This is due to the necessary 
consistency between our assumptions on the level of fertility in 2000 and the size 
of the youngest age group in that year. If we choose a rather high fertility level 
from our uncertainty distribution of the 2000 TFRs, we also need to choose a size 
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of the youngest age group that is comparatively larger because it was produced by 
these higher fertility rates over the past few years. 
In order to deal with this consistency issue between the chosen level of TFR 
and the size of the youngest age groups, we designed a specific routine that 
calculates a separate age distribution for the year 2000 for each of the 1,000 
separate simulation runs. This routine is based on the assumption that 
underreporting primarily affects children below school age. It assumes that the 
number of seven-year-old girls and boys reported in the census is more or less 
correct (of course, the method can also be applied assuming a higher age at which 
underreporting of children stops). Based on this assumption, we were able to 
calculate which level of TFR in 1993 produces the given number of children of 
that age group. Next, for each simulation run, a TFR value for 2000 was randomly 
chosen from the specified distribution. Then for each simulation, the following 
calculations were performed: A linear interpolation was applied between the TFR 
estimated for 1993 and the one assumed for 2000. The resulting TFRs were then 
applied to a projection that reproduced the number of births between 1993 and 
2000. Applying plausible child mortality rates produced a new age structure for 
the year 2000. As a result, for each simulation run we have a separate age 
structure for children that is exactly consistent with the fertility level chosen for 
the specific run. 
Figure 1 shows the resulting uncertainty distribution of the age pyramid of 
China in 2000. The grey area shows the age-specific uncertainties due to the 
alternatively estimated age distributions. 
 
 
3.4 Projections 
For the projection methodology itself, we chose the same approach as extensively 
discussed in Lutz et al. (2004). It is a stochastic simulation with annual 
fluctuations of vital rates within a variance as defined by expert opinion. The 
trends and the assumed ranges follow the same logic as in Lutz et al. (2004); we 
do not have room to discuss them here. In short, we carry out a set of 1000 
independent cohort component projections from which we draw the fertility and 
mortality levels for each year randomly from the specified uncertainty 
distributions using a moving average procedure to assure a certain serial 
correlation. For fertility a normal distribution was assumed with a mean of 1.5 
and 95% of all cases in the range between 1.0 and 2.0 before 2030, and after that 
with a mean of 1.7 and 95% of all future cases in the range between 1.2 and 2.2. 
This assumption implies that there is a chance that 5% will fall outside this range 
on either side. For mortality the starting life expectancy for 2000 was assumed to 
be 69.7 years for men and 74.5 years for women. We took this as a point estimate 
without explicit consideration of uncertainty. For the future, however, we 
assumed that life expectancy would on average increase by two years per decade 
with 95% of the uncertainty distribution falling between an increase of only one 
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year and three years per decade. This implies that for 2050 the ranges for life 
expectancy at birth go from 74.7 to 84.7 for men and from 79.5 to 89.5 for 
women. We also assumed a closed population, i.e., no net migration gains or 
losses. 
 
 
4  Results 
Figures 2 to 5 show the results of 1,000 simulations, each a separate cohort-
component projection with the starting conditions as well as fertility, sex ratio at 
birth and mortality drawn from the uncertainty distribution as described above. 
The figures present the results in terms of fractiles of the resulting distributions. 
The white line in the centre gives the median. The black area gives the range 
between the 0.4 and 0.6 fractiles, the dark grey area that between 0.2 and 0.8 and 
the light grey that between 0.025 and 0.975.  
Figure 2 shows the probabilistic age pyramid for China in 2050. To the left it 
lists the single years of age and to the right the corresponding years of birth of the 
cohort. For all cohorts below age 50, i.e., those born after 2000, the broad band of 
uncertainty reflects the combination of uncertain fertility in 2000 and uncertain 
future fertility trends. For the youngest cohorts, this uncertainty range is quite 
significant with the 95% interval going from around 2.5 million girls to 7.5 
million girls, the difference being a factor of three. For those aged 50-70 in 2050, 
the uncertainty range is the smallest. This is because these cohorts are already 
born and the cohort size is roughly known (subject only to the uncertainty about 
the current age distribution as discussed above) and they have not yet entered the 
high mortality ages when the uncertainty about future old-age mortality comes to 
bear. It is also remarkable that as a consequence of the Chinese demographic 
history, these very large age groups born between 1985 and 1990 are not only the 
biggest cohorts today, but will also be by far the biggest cohorts in 2050. And as 
the figure illustrates, there is very little uncertainty about this. 
Figure 3 shows the resulting uncertainty distribution for total population size. 
The median of the distribution shows further growth until reaching a peak of 1.38 
billion in 2020-2030 and then starts to slowly decline. In 2050 the median is 
already down to 1.25 billion. But as can be expected the uncertainty range opens 
with the passage of time. The upper 0.975 fractile keeps growing until around 
2035, reaching almost 1.5 billion; the lower 0.025 fractile starts to go down in 
2015 after having reached a peak of 1.30 billion. The 95% range in 2050 goes 
from 1.10 billion to 1.54 billion. 
Figure 4 shows the proportion of people below age 15. Here it is clearly 
visible that the uncertainty about the size of the youngest age groups today, 
together with the uncertainty of the current level of fertility, causes quite an 
unusual distribution up to 2025 after which point the pattern becomes more 
regular and essentially reflects the uncertainty of future fertility levels. Comparing 
this figure to the age pyramid (Figure 2), it is evident that the proportion of 
China’s uncertain demographic present and future 50 
children in the population is less uncertain than the absolute number of children. 
This is because in the case of a high-fertility trajectory, both the number of 
children and the total population will be higher. 
 
 
Figure 2: 
Probabilistic age pyramid, 2050 
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Note: The uncertainty distributions are described in the form of fractiles of the distribution of outcomes from all 
simulations. In the figures the black area gives the range between the .4 and .6 fractiles, the dark grey area that 
between .2 and .8 and the light grey that between .025 and .975, i.e., the 95 per cent interval. 
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Figure 3: 
Fractiles of distribution for total population, 2000-2100 
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Figure 4: 
Fractiles of distribution for proportion below age 15, 2000-2100 
China, Proportion below age 15
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Figure 5 shows the old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-65). This graph shows a 
most dramatic increase with very little uncertainty until around 2035. The old-age 
dependency ratio is almost certain to triple in only over three decades. This can be 
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said with high confidence as the 95% uncertainty range is very narrow, a 
consequence of the fact that a good deal of this increase is already pre-
programmed in today’s age structure. And even considering the uncertainty about 
this age structure does not change the pattern significantly. By around 2050 the 
old-age dependency ratio is expected to increase almost by a factor of five. 
 
Figure 5: 
Fractiles of distribution for old-age dependency ratio, 2000-2100 
China, Old-Age Dependency Ratio (65+ / 15-65)
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There is also great uncertainty about the possible size of the very old 
population in China, namely those above age 80. Currently only around 1% of the 
total population of China belong to this age group. This group is expected to 
gradually increase over the coming few decades to around 3% in 2030 with very 
little uncertainty. But over the decades 2030-2050, it is likely to see a marked 
increase reaching around 10% by the middle of the century, i.e., ten times its 
current size. Much of this increase is already embedded in the current age 
structure of the population due to the strong cohorts born around 1970. Another 
significant push in the proportion above age 80 is expected before 2070 when it is 
likely to jump to close to 15% of the total population because the very big cohorts 
born in the mid-1980s will reach this high age. Of course, the uncertainty range 
around this median projection significantly broadens during the second half of the 
century. Like in most other low-fertility countries in the world, the future course 
of old-age mortality is highly uncertain. If the proponents of an unabated increase 
in life expectancy are correct, then China may well have a quarter of its total 
population above the age of 80 by the end of the century. And even if the 
“pessimists” were right, this proportion would still increase to between 10% and 
15% of the population. 
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5  Conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated that over the coming decades, the world’s biggest 
national population will experience some of the most rapid and most massive 
processes of population ageing in world history. Neither current uncertainties 
about the level of fertility, the sex ratio and the number of children already born 
nor the uncertainty about future vital rates significantly weakens this very robust 
forecast. 
When it comes to population size, however, the uncertainties considered do 
have quite some impact. The projections show that there is about an 80% chance 
that by the end of the century, China’s population size will again fall below 
1 billion, even though over the coming decades we will see further increase due to 
the momentum caused by a young age structure. Almost certainly (with more than 
97.5% probability) China’s population will surpass 1.3 billion over the next few 
decades. The point at which it will begin to fall greatly depends on the 
assumptions made about current and future fertility trends as discussed. Our 
projections show that almost certainly (with a probability of more than 97.5%) the 
population will not reach 1.5 billion. The median shows a peak of 1.377 around 
2025. After that, the population starts to decline with the median in 2100 showing 
850 million people, almost 40% below its peak level. 
China is currently benefiting from a very low total dependency ratio. There 
are few children and not yet many elderly persons. This demographic window of 
opportunity, which is also one factor behind the currently very high economic 
growth rates, will close in the foreseeable future. Our projections show that there 
is no uncertainty that the old-age dependency burden will dramatically increase 
over the coming decades. This will pose serious challenges for China’s social and 
economic structure and needs to be addressed soon because such institutional 
adjustments take time. 
This expected population ageing and shrinking will also have significant 
impacts on the projected global trends. Contrary to earlier world population 
projections, fertility is now being assumed to lie in the 1.4-1.5 range around the 
year 2000 rather than in the 1.8-1.9 range as previously assumed, which will 
result in lower projected global population sizes. In its recent long range 
projections (still based on a 2000 TFR of 1.8) the UN Population Division 
projects a population for China of 1.395 billion in 2050 and 1.181 billion in 2100 
(UN 2004). In its 2004 fertility data sheet, the UN gives a TFR estimate of 1.4 for 
2001 (UN 2005). This has not yet been implemented into their published 
projections. Based on these more recent assumptions, our projections presented 
here show that the population of China is likely to be 334 million less in 2100 
than the number given in the UN long-range projections. This implies that world 
population size would have to be corrected downwards by 0.33 billion in 2100. 
This paper has also shown that existing methods of expert-based probabilistic 
forecasting can readily be expanded to include uncertainty about the current 
demographic conditions. They provide a comprehensive tool to jointly consider 
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all sources of uncertainty that can influence the evolution of population age and 
structure over time. To the user they can provide an easy to understand summary 
of all expert knowledge and expert judgement on what can be said about likely 
future population patterns and the degree of confidence with which such 
information should be seen. 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
China, life expectancy 
Indicator Interval Sex 2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
e0 0.025 Total 72.269 72.810 73.717 74.543 75.250 75.868 76.683 77.982 78.245 79.670 79.956
e0 0.2 Total 72.524 73.448 74.891 76.364 77.641 79.188 80.818 82.264 83.789 85.744 87.041
e0 0.4 Total 72.657 73.799 75.619 77.445 79.259 81.104 82.939 84.739 86.610 88.792 90.572
e0 0.6 Total 72.779 74.084 76.262 78.417 80.488 82.438 84.637 86.873 88.887 91.163 93.473
e0 0.8 Total 72.934 74.436 76.956 79.472 81.982 84.302 86.843 89.306 92.110 94.735 97.272
e0 0.975 Total 73.183 75.079 78.385 81.413 84.980 87.800 90.821 94.082 97.129 101.077 103.471
e0 Mean Total 72.721 73.939 75.962 77.946 79.883 81.760 83.782 85.791 87.842 90.144 92.075
e0 Median Total 72.716 73.944 75.956 77.907 79.847 81.766 83.777 85.857 87.670 90.144 92.018
e0 STDev Total 0.238 0.587 1.207 1.834 2.513 3.032 3.622 4.137 4.814 5.459 6.032
 
China, proportion below age 15 
Indicator Interval Sex 2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Prop 0-15 0.025 Total 0.187 0.150 0.131 0.098 0.081 0.084 0.075 0.076 0.076 0.074 0.075 
Prop 0-15 0.2 Total 0.195 0.165 0.148 0.117 0.104 0.103 0.097 0.102 0.101 0.100 0.100 
Prop 0-15 0.4 Total 0.200 0.173 0.159 0.126 0.115 0.116 0.109 0.113 0.114 0.114 0.114 
Prop 0-15 0.6 Total 0.203 0.179 0.165 0.134 0.124 0.126 0.119 0.124 0.125 0.125 0.126 
Prop 0-15 0.8 Total 0.207 0.186 0.174 0.144 0.136 0.137 0.131 0.138 0.140 0.139 0.142 
Prop 0-15 0.975 Total 0.215 0.199 0.189 0.161 0.158 0.157 0.155 0.161 0.162 0.163 0.163 
Prop 0-15 Mean Total 0.201 0.175 0.161 0.130 0.120 0.121 0.114 0.119 0.120 0.119 0.121 
Prop 0-15 Median Total 0.201 0.176 0.162 0.130 0.120 0.121 0.115 0.119 0.120 0.120 0.121 
Prop 0-15 STDev Total 0.007 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 
 
China, proportion 15-65 
Indicator Interval Sex 2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Prop 15-65 0.025 Total 0.709 0.716 0.689 0.666 0.599 0.551 0.485 0.459 0.427 0.411 0.403 
Prop 15-65 0.2 Total 0.716 0.728 0.701 0.678 0.611 0.572 0.523 0.504 0.482 0.471 0.468 
Prop 15-65 0.4 Total 0.719 0.735 0.707 0.683 0.618 0.583 0.539 0.526 0.507 0.499 0.496 
Prop 15-65 0.6 Total 0.723 0.740 0.713 0.689 0.625 0.593 0.554 0.542 0.527 0.522 0.521 
Prop 15-65 0.8 Total 0.727 0.747 0.721 0.695 0.632 0.602 0.569 0.562 0.549 0.545 0.543 
Prop 15-65 0.975 Total 0.734 0.760 0.733 0.707 0.646 0.621 0.595 0.591 0.585 0.586 0.585 
Prop 15-65 Mean Total 0.721 0.738 0.711 0.686 0.622 0.587 0.545 0.532 0.514 0.507 0.505 
Prop 15-65 Median Total 0.721 0.737 0.710 0.686 0.621 0.588 0.546 0.534 0.516 0.512 0.508 
Prop 15-65 STDev Total 0.006 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.018 0.028 0.034 0.040 0.045 0.047 
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China, proportion above age 80 
Indicator Interval Sex 2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Prop 80+ 0.025 Total 0.011 0.015 0.019 0.028 0.042 0.067 0.073 0.093 0.091 0.088 0.097 
Prop 80+ 0.2 Total 0.012 0.015 0.020 0.030 0.047 0.080 0.090 0.119 0.121 0.124 0.147 
Prop 80+ 0.4 Total 0.012 0.015 0.021 0.031 0.051 0.088 0.102 0.137 0.144 0.150 0.175 
Prop 80+ 0.6 Total 0.012 0.015 0.021 0.032 0.054 0.095 0.113 0.154 0.163 0.173 0.205 
Prop 80+ 0.8 Total 0.012 0.015 0.022 0.034 0.058 0.104 0.128 0.175 0.195 0.208 0.241 
Prop 80+ 0.975 Total 0.012 0.016 0.023 0.038 0.067 0.125 0.162 0.225 0.260 0.289 0.327 
Prop 80+ Mean Total 0.012 0.015 0.021 0.032 0.053 0.093 0.110 0.148 0.159 0.168 0.195 
Prop 80+ Median Total 0.012 0.015 0.021 0.032 0.052 0.092 0.107 0.144 0.154 0.161 0.190 
Prop 80+ STDev Total 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.014 0.023 0.034 0.044 0.051 0.058 
 
China, proportion above age 65 
Indicator Interval Sex 2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Prop 65+ 0.025 Total 0.076 0.084 0.121 0.166 0.224 0.240 0.264 0.265 0.272 0.271 0.261 
Prop 65+ 0.2 Total 0.077 0.086 0.125 0.176 0.244 0.269 0.305 0.307 0.319 0.320 0.322 
Prop 65+ 0.4 Total 0.077 0.087 0.127 0.181 0.254 0.284 0.329 0.334 0.348 0.355 0.354 
Prop 65+ 0.6 Total 0.078 0.087 0.129 0.185 0.262 0.297 0.349 0.358 0.377 0.384 0.386 
Prop 65+ 0.8 Total 0.078 0.088 0.132 0.191 0.273 0.315 0.374 0.387 0.412 0.419 0.425 
Prop 65+ 0.975 Total 0.079 0.090 0.136 0.203 0.298 0.354 0.430 0.450 0.482 0.507 0.513 
Prop 65+ Mean Total 0.078 0.087 0.128 0.184 0.259 0.292 0.341 0.349 0.366 0.373 0.374 
Prop 65+ Median Total 0.078 0.087 0.128 0.183 0.258 0.291 0.338 0.345 0.361 0.368 0.372 
Prop 65+ STDev Total 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.018 0.028 0.041 0.048 0.055 0.060 0.063 
 
China, old-age dependency ratio (OADR), ratio 65+/(15-65) 
Indicator Interval Sex 2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
OADR 0.025 Total 0.107 0.117 0.173 0.245 0.359 0.393 0.453 0.455 0.471 0.470 0.449 
OADR 0.2 Total 0.107 0.118 0.177 0.257 0.389 0.447 0.536 0.549 0.583 0.592 0.594 
OADR 0.4 Total 0.107 0.118 0.179 0.264 0.408 0.480 0.594 0.615 0.662 0.677 0.679 
OADR 0.6 Total 0.108 0.118 0.181 0.270 0.423 0.510 0.646 0.677 0.738 0.764 0.778 
OADR 0.8 Total 0.108 0.119 0.184 0.277 0.441 0.547 0.713 0.769 0.854 0.887 0.908 
OADR 0.975 Total 0.108 0.119 0.188 0.293 0.487 0.638 0.882 0.986 1.133 1.223 1.277 
OADR Mean Total 0.108 0.118 0.180 0.267 0.416 0.498 0.630 0.664 0.726 0.752 0.760 
OADR Median Total 0.108 0.118 0.180 0.267 0.414 0.495 0.619 0.644 0.700 0.721 0.732 
OADR STDev Total 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.032 0.059 0.108 0.135 0.170 0.196 0.206 
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China, total population (million) 
Indicator Interval Sex 2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population 0.025 Total 1.266 1.287 1.299 1.255 1.172 1.060 0.917 0.787 0.676 0.594 0.517 
Population 0.2 Total 1.279 1.309 1.342 1.317 1.258 1.163 1.049 0.943 0.841 0.758 0.688 
Population 0.4 Total 1.286 1.323 1.366 1.352 1.307 1.230 1.123 1.035 0.934 0.859 0.793 
Population 0.6 Total 1.292 1.333 1.383 1.380 1.347 1.280 1.185 1.102 1.021 0.955 0.896 
Population 0.8 Total 1.299 1.345 1.405 1.414 1.396 1.347 1.271 1.201 1.127 1.067 1.028 
Population 0.975 Total 1.311 1.368 1.451 1.482 1.495 1.476 1.444 1.398 1.347 1.311 1.292 
Population Mean Total 1.289 1.328 1.374 1.366 1.329 1.257 1.161 1.073 0.987 0.917 0.864 
Population Median Total 1.289 1.328 1.375 1.366 1.326 1.252 1.157 1.064 0.973 0.900 0.847 
Population STDev Total 0.011 0.021 0.038 0.058 0.082 0.107 0.130 0.152 0.171 0.187 0.199 
